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This paper analyzes the impact of agency problems on two entrepreneurs’ choice whether to
carry out a stand-alone or a joint project. A joint project can be conducted by a single or
both entrepreneurs’ research units, which are substitutes to a varying degree. Joint projects
are chosen when they are of high value and/or for low degrees of duplication and comple-
mentarities between the units. Agency problems reduce the occurrence of joint projects as
they have to be of higher value and/or exploit higher synergies. Joint projects making use
of potential synergies are chosen too seldomly from a welfare standpoint.
Keywords: agency problems, joint projects, internal organization, synergies.
JEL codes: D23, D82, L241 Introduction
A number of research and development intensive industries, such as the software, biotechnol-
ogy, the automobile, the electronics industry and many others have seen a strong increase in
joint research and development projects. These joint projects may take the form for example
of research joint ventures (RJVs), alliances, or bilateral agreements. Joint projects may cover
various stages of the innovation process. Taking the pharmaceutical industry as an example,
they may range from basic research, such as inventing new chemical entities (NCE) — that
can then be used to develop medicaments having certain therapeutical indications — up to
the development of new ﬁnal products, such as drugs — including performing the necessary
tests to get them approved by regulatory authorities (such as the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration, FDA, in the US)1. The value created in these joint projects is often considerable and
of high social interest. For this reason, there have been public programs set up by several
governments and supranational authorities to support these projects. The EU for example
does so within the "European Framework Programs". Out of the 363 million euro spent on
"Promotion of Innovation and Encouragement of SME2 Participation in R&D" within the
5th edition of these "European Framework Programs" from 1998 until 2000, the EU devoted
200 million euro to "Joint innovation/SME activities".
The relevance of this phenomenon explains the interest in studying the formation mecha-
nisms, to analyze the rationale, possible failures, duration, and not least the impact on social
welfare of joint projects.
Most of the recent literature that studies the underlying incentives to enter into joint
projects as well as the conditions for their stability, concentrates on economic agents taking
these decisions as if they were also responsible for carrying out the research. There is usually
no separation between ownership and control. Therefore, possible conﬂicts between who
takes the decision on whether to conduct a joint research, i.e. who has the formal control
on this decision, and who might aﬀect the outcome of the research, i.e. who has the real
control, are not accounted for3.
Our model departs from the traditional owner-manager view, by explicitly considering
1See Pammolli (1996) for a discussion on R&D in the pharmaceutical industry.
2Small and medium sized enterprises.
3For example, Espinosa and Macho-Stadler (2003) consider the endogenous formation of partnerships by
ﬁrms in a double sided moral hazard context, i.e. each ﬁrm has to decide its level of production with which
to contribute to the overall output of the partnership. Each owner has an incentive to free-ride on other
owners by deciding how much (unobservable) eﬀort to put into the overall production of the partnership.
However, an owner-managers view on the problem is adopted, i.e. each owner is at the same time his own
agent.
1the impact of principal-agent relations on formation and internal organization of RJVs by
allowing owners to decide whether to conduct a project alone or jointly, under both, the
owner-manager and the principal-agent assumptions. Research units will be responsible of
conducting the projects: their eﬀort — alternatively observable or unobservable — determines
in our model the probability of success of the projects. A joint project can be conducted by
only one owner’s research unit or both owners’ research units (agents) together. In the latter
case, our analysis will allow for these units to be substitutes to a varying degree. The model
assesses the impact of agency problems on the owners’ decisions to carry out a stand-alone
or a joint project and whether to use possible synergies between research units.
To our best knowledge, there is one study of joint research that takes an explicit agency
approach, Pastor and Sandonís (2002). The authors do not consider incentives to enter joint
research projects: comparing cross-licensing agreements with research joint ventures in the
presence of agency problems, joint research is the only means entrepreneurs have to conduct
a given project. Therefore, staying alone is not an option and, contrary to our model, the
analysis of the underlying incentives to form a research alliance is ruled out by assumption.
The underlying assumption in their work is that each research unit’s success is essential,
both for the cross-licensing and for the research joint venture cases. By contrast, allowing
for several degrees of substitution between research units (managers) involved in the joint
project in order to reach a success, we are also able to characterize not only the decisions
whether to join, but also the decision of how to do so as a function of these diﬀerent degrees
of substitution.
By accounting for possible substitutability, duplication, or complementarity of the agents’
eﬀorts in the functional form of the probability of success, we also depart from the team
production literature4 where the success of a task assigned to each agent is fundamental
for the success of a given project. In our model, interactions between agents allow for
potential synergies. However, results will show that synergies are not necessarily exploited in
equilibrium. This is a consequence of a trade-oﬀ between the potential enhanced probability
of success of the joint project for a given eﬀort and the increased cost of providing it due to
the optimal incentive compatible contracts to be oﬀered to both research units.
Another aspect of our model consists of endogenizing the cost associated with conducting
a research project. An often proposed argument to explain the forming a partnership is
the ability that share ﬁxed costs that would have to be incurred by each party separately
otherwise. These ﬁxed costs savings encompass research costs, savings on assets such as
avoiding to replicate laboratories, as it is argued in Harrigan (1986). The relative beneﬁts of
enjoying a success, either alone or jointly, provides the rationale for private decisions whether
4See, for example, Holmström (1982) or Itoh (1991).
2to run a joint or a stand-alone project. In our model the endogenized cost of conducting
a research project can be considered to play an equivalent role as, in standard models, the
ﬁxed costs may play.
In order to concentrate on agency problems coming from moral hazard we abstract from
several potentially interesting aspects like the fear of disclosing private know-how within a
joint project, from market power considerations, and from the bargaining process underlying
the determination of the sharing rule for the joint projects’ beneﬁts and costs. The potential
trade-oﬀ between staying alone and joining when there is the fear of disclosing each ﬁrm’s
private know-how within a joint project has been considered by Pérez-Castrillo and Sandonís
(1996). The abstraction from market power considerations (in the sense that the overall
potential value of the market that projects can target does not depend on whether they join or
not) suits situations where a success pays oﬀ aw e l ld e ﬁned value, which can be appropriated,
totally or partially, by the author of this success. Examples are R&D projects leading to
the patenting of the invention/innovation, or to the approval of a certain drug targeting
a potential market. While the overall value of the market is kept ﬁxed, we distinguish in
our analysis between independent and common market projects. This separation is meant
to capture both the cases where a stand-alone project is not facing a rival one, and the
one where it does. Having conducted a successful stand-alone project will pay oﬀ a ﬁxed
value independent of whether the other entrepreneur succeeded if this projects targeted
independent markets. As an example one could think of a market which is segmented due
to regional regulatory constraints that do not allow an innovator to use a patent in another
country than the one where the innovation was obtained. If the projects aim at a common
market on the other hand, a success would have to be shared with the other entrepreneur
if his project succeeds as well. Finally, concerning the bargaining, we assume an exogenous
equal sharing of costs and beneﬁts of the joint projects. This simpliﬁcation is made in order
to focus on the impact of agency problems on decision whether to join and how to join
between equally important partners in the joint project.
Results will show that the decision to pursue joint projects is always taken between ﬁrms
facing independent markets, no matter whether research units are aﬀected by moral hazard
behavior or not. However, for both, observable and unobservable eﬀorts, under the common
market assumption, ﬁrms start preferring staying alone as long as the value of the overall
market to be targeted is not high enough, and/or if the degree of duplication is not too high.
When entrepreneurs face agency problems, the value of the overall market to be targeted has
to be higher than under observable eﬀorts for entrepreneurs to pursue a joint project. The
additional agency costs may induce the parties to stay alone even if they would otherwise
have chosen to conduct the project jointly either with one or both units. Our results show
3that moral hazard, and thus, an increase of the component that inﬂates the cost of producing
an innovation, is not af a c t o rt h a td r i v e sﬁrms to share it necessarily, i.e. to share a "ﬁxed"
cost, as it is usually considered. Given that the wage to be paid to the research management
can be adjusted implementing the optimal wage contract associated with each case, ﬁrms
may still decide to stay alone instead. In particular, the occurrence of joint projects where
both units are kept is decreased systematically as higher complementarities are needed to
sustain this conﬁguration against either stand-alone or a joint project with one unit.
The analysis of the impacts of privately taken decisions over the social welfare, will show
that conﬂicts arise under the moral hazard assumption where joint projects keeping both
research units would be preferred socially, but privately ﬁrms prefer either to join keeping
only one unit or not to join at all. Too few socially desirable joint projects exploiting synergies
are observed.
The work is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the setup of the model.
Section 3 is devoted to the analysis of the owner-manager case. In section 4, we analyze the
principal-agent alternative and compare results with the ones obtained in section 3. Section
5 concludes and discusses possible extensions of the model.
2 The Model
In this section, we describe the stand-alone conﬁguration for both, projects targeting in-
dependent markets - or market segments - (I)a n dt h o s et a r g e t i n gacommon market (C),
as well as the joint research conﬁgurations in which either one or both research units are
kept. We ﬁrst describe the characteristics of the projects, the utility of the agents’ conduct-
ing them, the probability of success attached to the projects, and, ﬁnally, we introduce the
notion of social welfare that is adopted in our study.
Entrepreneurs’ projects Let two entrepreneurs pursue a project leading to an innovation
targeting a potential market, the overall value of which is ∆.W ec a nt h i n ko f∆ as the value
attached to licensing out, or patenting, an innovation to be used for the market. The market
is exogenously segmented, into two parts, each of which is assumed to be of equal value ∆
2 .
As said, we distinguish the case in which entrepreneurs are either able to access one
segment of the market, distinct from the segment accessed by the other, from the case in
which each of them is able to access both segments of the market5.
5The ﬁrst situation, where entrepreneurs may be initially present in only one segment, can be interpreted
as the case where only this "home" entrepreneur knows the regulatory framework of its country, which is a
necessary condition to get approved for the innovation there, but not the other "foreign" entrepreneur. The
4Given the segmentation of the market, if the project is conducted alone and each of the
entrepreneurs can invest in a distinct segment of the available market, we will refer to the
adoption of projects targeting independent markets, paying oﬀ ∆
2 to each entrepreneur in
the case of his success6. If each entrepreneur targets both segments, we will refer instead
to projects targeting a common market, paying oﬀ ∆ to a successful entrepreneur if he is
the only one succeeding, or ∆
2 to each of them if both are succeeding. It can be shown that
our results do not change qualitatively if we assume that a success of both entrepreneurs in
the common markets situation destroys value, i.e. if the value to be appropriated by each
entrepreneur were smaller than ∆
2 .
Whenever instead, entrepreneurs decide to conduct a joint project, its success is assumed
to lead to a success to be used in both segments of the market7,p a y i n go ﬀ ∆.
In case of failure, a project always pays oﬀ zero.
Projects are assumed to be carried out by agents (research units, divisions, etc.) em-
ployed by the entrepreneurs. The agents aﬀect the probability of success of the project they
conduct through their chosen eﬀort. We assume that each entrepreneur employs initially
one agent (research unit, division, etc.). If the entrepreneurs decide to conduct the projects
alone, we refer to a stand-alone case, either (S|I) or (S|C). If the entrepreneurs combine
their assets for a joint project, we refer to either (J1) or (J2) depending on whether the
entrepreneurs decide to keep each of their agents i, with i =1 ,2 to conduct the joint project,
or only one of them. We are implicitly assuming that each agent has embedded the scien-
tiﬁc knowledge/capability to conduct the project alone8. Any time the project is conducted
jointly, we further assume that a new entity is founded. We refer to this entity as the joint
entity. As mentioned already, entrepreneurs share the costs and the beneﬁts of conducting
the joint project equally.
Summarizing the assumptions made, we can write the diﬀerent payoﬀs R(·) associated
second situation accounts for the case where both entrepreneurs have access to - or can develop for - both
segments: this is possible either because they were initially present in both segments; or because each of
them was initially present only in one segment, but they decide to conduct a joint project — and thus share
the necessary knowledge for obtaining approval in their respective segments.
6This comes from the assumption of equally sized segments.
7The underlying assumption for this is that a project success in one segment can be easily translated into
a success in the other segment: e.g. given the now common knowledge about the regulatory frameworks of
each respective separate market, joining ﬁrms can tailor the project such that its scientiﬁcs u c c e s se n s u r e s
it to be used in both segments.
8As discussed before, this does not yet guarantee to access both segments of the market as there is still
t h er e g u l a t o r yh u r d l et ob et a k e n .





with Pr = pi (S)









with Pr = pi (S)(1− p−i (S))
with Pr = pi (S)p−i (S)
with Pr = 1 − pi (S),
(2)
where pi (S) and p−i (S) are the probabilities of success of ﬁrms i and −i, respectively.





with Pr = p(J1)





with Pr = p(J2)
with Pr = 1 − p(J2), (4)
where p(J1) and p(J2) are the probabilities of success of the joint project keeping one or
two agents/research units, respectively.
Agents Agents aﬀect the probability of success of the project they conduct through their
eﬀort. We consider both, the cases where the agents exert an observable, contractable eﬀort
ei and where they exert a non observable, therefore not-contractable, eﬀort. Exerting this
eﬀort ei implies a disutility for the agent that is equal to ci (ei)=1
2e2
i. For conducting
t h ep r o j e c t ,a g e n t sr e c e i v eat r a n s f e rti ≥ 0 from the entrepreneurs employing them. Both,
entrepreneurs and agents are risk neutral, however, agents are protected by limited liability.
We assume the agents’ utility to be additively separable between eﬀort and money,






In case of unobservable eﬀorts, a contract, specifying a transfer to the agents cannot be
made contingent on their exerted eﬀorts, but only on the observable and veriﬁable success
or failure of the project. In this case, the optimal contract requires the transfer to the agents







In the joint cases ((J1), (J2))w ew i l ld r o pt h ei n d e xi while referring to the transfer
agent(s) receive from the joint entity. If two agents are kept, we impose equal transfers to
both agents9. In our model, giving equal wages for equal jobs, would emerge in equilibrium
as the result of the minimization of the cost of implementing a given probability of success.
This result is shown in appendix A.
9This may be due to legal constraints which oblige owners to pay comparable wages/transfers for compa-
6Probability of success As already mentioned, agents aﬀect the probability of success of











Whenever only one agent is assigned to the project, this success probability collapses to
either Pr(success|S)i ≡ p(S)i = ei if each agent is employed by stand-alone entrepreneurs,
or Pr(success|J1) ≡ p(J1) = e if the agent is employed by the joint entity. If both agents









The parameter ε ∈ [ε,1[ determines the way agents’ eﬀorts interact with each other
depending on the technology possibilities attached to a given project. We restrict the ε
below in order to fulﬁll second order conditions of the entrepreneurs’ optimization problems.
We restrict it above as we want to keep the assumption that the project can be carried
out by one agent alone. A value of ε which would tend to inﬁnity would imply that agents’
eﬀorts are perfect complements, i.e. both agents’ eﬀo r t sw o u l db en e e d e dt ob r i n gt h ep r oj e c t
to a success. For this reason, and for tractability of the model, as we want to ensure the
continuity of the maximization problems to be solved, we assume an upper bound for ε equal
to 1. However, with or without this limit on the upper bound for ε, results are not aﬀected.
Allowing for positive values of this parameter we can still consider situations where some
projects may require agents to work together for the project to succeed. We can think about
a project that lets the agents acquire information while exerting an eﬀort together. This
information needs to be shared between the two agents and it is crucial for making the
project successful. Given this situation, a part of the eﬀort of the agent working more than
the other would be lost and would not contribute to the overall success of the project.
The technology parameter can also be negative. A negative ε accounts for the degree to
which the agents’ eﬀorts are duplicates.
rable jobs. It could also be in the interest of the entrepreneurs to let their agents follow the project jointly
in order not to loose part of the tacit knowledge that agents may acquire during the development of the
project itself. Furthermore, giving an incentive contract to only one of the two agents will reduce this case
to the (J1) case.
10We will derive the optimal contracts not taking into account any restrictions on the parameters ∆ and ε
such that the probability of success is well deﬁned, e.g. smaller than 1. If the unrestricted solution speciﬁed
a probability level greater than one, entrepreneurs would not be able to increase the probability of success
over the value of one by paying a higher transfer. They would, therefore, optimally specify an implemented
eﬀort and a transfer such that the probability is exactly equal to one. In the following analysis, we provide
the unrestricted solutions for the optimally implemented eﬀorts and transfers, however, it is always possible
to verify that the results are unalterated by allowing for the restriction on the exogenous parameters to bind.
7Finally, if ε =0 , agents’ eﬀorts are perfect substitutes. An example for this case is
a project, which can be divided into two parts that may each partially contribute to the
overall success of the project and which are assigned each to a diﬀerent agent. Here no
agent’s eﬀort overlaps the one of the other and the probability of success is determined by
the overall amount of eﬀort exerted by the two agents.
Social Welfare As we want to draw conclusions about the welfare impact of the entre-
preneurs’ organizational choice ((S|·), (J1),o r(J2)), we now deﬁne the measure of social
welfare W(·) we will use for each of the diﬀerent environments we consider. Social welfare is
assumed to consist of both the entrepreneurs’ expected net proﬁts and the agents’ expected










































respectively for the stand-alone independent markets and common markets, and for the
joint-one agent or two-agents cases.
The welfare induced by the privately taken decision is the result of both the speciﬁcc o n -
ﬁguration chosen for undertaking the project and the corresponding implemented probability
of success.
In the stand-alone independent markets situation, segment i of the market will be served
with probability ei, creating a value of ∆
2 in case of success of the project targeting that
segment. In the stand-alone common market situation, at least one entrepreneur’s success
leads to serving the whole market, creating a value of ∆, which happens with probability
e1 + e2 − e1e2. In the joint project cases, (J1) and (J2), a success of the project allows the
joint entity to create the value of ∆.
In any case, conducting a project comes at a cost: the agents’ disutility of exerting an
eﬀort, 1
2e2
i for each agent assigned to the project.
Timing Given that the target of stand-alone projects (independent markets or a common
market) is exogenously taken ex ante, the actions of the diﬀerent players can be summarized
as follows:
81. Entrepreneurs simultaneously decide whether they want to invest in a joint or in a
stand-alone project and how many agents to keep if they join.
2. Entrepreneurs oﬀer contract(s) to the agent(s) involved in the project.
3. Agent(s) accept(s) or reject(s) the contract(s).
4. Agent(s) decide(s) on an eﬀort level to be exerted.
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Figure 1: Timing
3 Benchmark: The owner-manager case
The goal of this section is to provide a benchmark analysis of the optimal organizations
either when the agents’ eﬀorts are observable and therefore it is possible to make the transfer
contingent to the exerted eﬀort11.
This benchmark will be compared to the parallel analysis when the eﬀorts are not ob-
servable12. Comparisons will allow us to assess the impact of the separation between formal
and real control — entrepreneurs have the power to decide whether to join, but agents aﬀect
the real outcome of that decision — on the privately chosen conﬁguration and on the social
welfare.
11Or, seeing it diﬀerently, when we have an owner-manager, i.e. an entrepreneur who could provide that
eﬀort alone, as if the he was also the manager. An example could be the case of a biotech ﬁrm funded by
the biotechnician that is conducting the research himself. In this case of the analysis, we will adhere to the
formulation that corresponds to the entrepreneur(s) having full control over their agent’(s) eﬀorts. However,
doing so, the alternative interpretation of the owner-manager case just given remains valid.
12This may happen any time the entrepreneur is not able to conduct the project alone, but needs the
agent(s) and he is not able to judge whether the agent(s) behaved or not, but he can simply observe the
result of his actions, either a success or a failure.
93.1 Stand-alone (S)
In this section we consider the case in which each entrepreneur conducts the project alone,
employing one agent each. Here only the eﬀort of this agent determines the probability of
success of the project13,i . e . pi(S)=ei. However, as outlined in the model setup, in our
analysis, a success allows to access either one or both segments of a market depending on
whether the project targeted a independent or a common market. For this reason, in the
following analysis we distinguish between these two possible projects.
3.1.1 Independent Markets (I)
We ﬁrst assume that the projects target independent market segments. This means that,
when the entrepreneur is successful, he enjoys ∆
2 , regardless of the success or failure of the
other entrepreneur. Each entrepreneur pays out a transfer that lets the agent break even.
Therefore, each entrepreneur solves the following maximization problem:
max
ei














i ≥ 0 (IR)
ti ≥ 0. (LL)




















where the superscript o denotes the proﬁt-maximizing solution in the observable eﬀorts case.
Following the notion of social welfare introduced in the general set up of the model, the


















13Alternatively, the entrepreneur conducts the project alone facing the same disutility of eﬀort as the agent
would.
103.1.2 Common Market (C)
We now assume that entrepreneurs target a common market. According to our assumptions,
if only one entrepreneur succeeds, he will be able to appropriate the whole value of the
market, ∆; however, if both entrepreneurs succeed, they will have to share this value equally,
appropriating each ∆
2 . Again, each entrepreneur pays out a transfer that lets the agent break
even.
Each entrepreneur, thus, solves the following maximization problem:
max
ei

















i ≥ 0 (IR)
ti ≥ 0, (LL)




















where, again, the superscript o denotes the proﬁt-maximizing solution in the observable
eﬀorts case.



















In this subsection, we assume that entrepreneurs decide to pursue the research project jointly.
In this world, the project is targeting the whole (common) market.
When two entrepreneurs invest into a joint project, as assumed, they form a new en-
tity and choose either to let one agent run the project alone or to let their agents work
t o g e t h e r .W ea l s oa s s u m e dt h a tt h ej o i n te n t i t yo ﬀers a transfer to their agent(s), and that
entrepreneurs share equally the cost of the transfer(s), as well as the payoﬀ of the project.
113.2.1 Joint-one agent (J1)
In the (J1) case, only the eﬀort of one agent determines the probability of success of the
joint project so that p(J1) = e. As assumed, in case of success, both segments of the market
are covered, giving rise to a value of ∆.
Therefore, the joint entity’s maximization problem is:
max
e Π(J1) = max





2 ≥ 0 (IR)
t ≥ 0 (LL)
As in the previous subsection we can derive the following solution to this problem:
e
o (J1) = p






















3.2.2 Joint-two agents (J2)









1−ε. As cost minimization requires that the joint entity proposes to
each agent exactly the same contract14,w es h o wr e s u l t sh e r ea si ft h ec o n s t r a i n tw a si m p o s e d
from the beginning. Again it is assumed that in case of success both segments of the market
are covered, giving rise to a value of ∆.
Therefore, given that we take t1 = t2 = t, the joint entity’s maximization problem is:
max

















i ≥ 0 ∀i (IR)
t ≥ 0 ∀i. (LL)
14The proof is given in appendix A.
12This problem leads to the following results:
e
o
i (J2) = e






























3.3 Optimal organizational form for observable eﬀorts
We are now able to draw some conclusions about the privately (and socially, as they co-
incide in this case) chosen organizations when eﬀorts are observable. The following table
summarizes the results found above:




























The comparison between the diﬀerent levels of proﬁts (and social welfare) lead to the
following proposition.
Proposition 1 Under the owner-manager assumption (alternatively: for observable eﬀorts),
(i) in the independent markets case, entrepreneurs always invest jointly,
(a) for ε ∈ ]−1,1[,t h e yk e e pb o t ha g e n t s ,
(b) for ε/ ∈ ]−1,1[,t h e yk e e po n ea g e n t ,
(ii) in the common markets case,




and invest in a stand-alone project otherwise,




and invest in a stand-alone project otherwise.
In our results we do not distinguish between privately and socially preferred conﬁgura-
tions, as they coincide under observability of the agents’ eﬀorts15.
When entrepreneurs are facing a independent markets world, there are only eﬀects on
the expected cost side: the cost of implementing the optimal eﬀo r ti sp o s s i b l et ob es h a r e d
in (J1), or synergies are exploited in (J2). There is no eﬀect on the expected payoﬀss i d e
when implementing one and the same level of the probability of success. This explains the
decision to always join under the independent markets assumption.
In contrast, when entrepreneurs face a common market, we have to distinguish between
two cases. Entrepreneurs join, opting for (J2), either as long as the agents’ eﬀorts are
complements, for ε ∈ ]0,1[, no matter which is the overall value of the market, or when the
value of the market is high enough in presence of agents’ eﬀorts which are slight duplicates
]−1,0[. The less the agents’ eﬀorts duplicate each other, the lower is the value of the market
necessary for them to join. For higher degrees of duplication (J1) is chosen over (S|C) as
long as the overall value of the market is high enough.
Results for the common market case are shown graphically in ﬁgure 2.
The Πo
(S),(J2) is the indiﬀerence curve of relevant combinations of ∆ and ε above which
(J2) is preferred to (S|C); similarly, Πo
(S),(J1) is the indiﬀerence curve for the relevant com-
binations of the same parameters above which proﬁts in (J1) are higher than the ones in
(S|C); and, ﬁnally, for the relevant parameters combinations the indiﬀerence curve Πo
(J1),(J2)
separates the left(right) area where proﬁts in (J1) are higher(lower) than in (J2). Therefore,
these three curves depict three regions: area (S|C)
o, (J1)
o,a n d(J2)
o,w h e r eﬁrms prefer
(S|C), (J1),a n d(J2), respectively.
Note that we derived the optimal contracts not taking into account any restrictions on
the parameters ∆ and ε such that the associated probabilities of success are well deﬁned,
e.g. smaller than 1. For example, for ∆ =2 , the unrestricted solution for the stand-
alone case speciﬁes an eﬀort level eo
i (S|C)=1and, thus, implements a probability of
success of po
i (S|C)=1 .F o r ∆ > 2, the unrestricted solution would specify an eﬀort
15If the innovation led to the commercialization of a product, then consumers’ surplus considerations could
make a diﬀerence between what would be privately chosen from what would be socially desirable. In Fabrizi
and Lippert (2004) similar considerations are taken into account as a merging decision is analyzed together
with its impact on the overall social welfare that includes consumers’ surplus.


































Figure 2: Optimal conﬁgurations for observable eﬀorts.
level greater than 1. However, entrepreneurs cannot increase the probability of success by
implementing an higher eﬀort, i.e. even by paying higher transfers. The restricted solution
requires implemented eﬀorts and transfers such that eo
i (S|C)=1and to
i (S|C)=1
2.I nt h e
same spirit, the restricted contracts can be found for the stand-alone conﬁguration in the
independent markets case, as well as for the joint conﬁgurations with one or two agents: for
∆ > 2, eo
i (S|I)=1and to
i (S|I)=1
2,f o r∆ > 1, eo (J1) = 1 and to (J1) = 1




i (J2) = 2
− 1
1−ε and to
i (J2) = 1
22
− 1
1−ε.N o t e t h a t ﬁgure 2 takes into account
both, the unrestricted and the restricted contracts, enabling us to make the same proﬁta n d






, too. The reason for this is that indiﬀerence
curves depicted would not change when taking the restricted solutions: those between the






and the one between
t h et w oj o i n tc o n ﬁg u r a t i o n si si n d e p e n d e n to f∆. A similar reasoning can be replicated for
the unobservable case.
To give an intuition about how ﬁrms take their decision between staying alone or pursuing
a joint project in the common markets case, we need to distinguish between two possible
eﬀects: one coming from the diﬀerences in expected payoﬀs and another from diﬀerences in
expected costs, associated with one conﬁguration instead of the other.
First, the expected payoﬀs associated with (S|C) and (J1) for one and the same prob-
ability of success are respectively p(1 − p)∆ + p2 ∆
2 = p(2 − p) ∆
2 and p∆
2 .I no t h e rw o r d s ,
the expected payoﬀ for this probability is higher in (S|C) than in (J1). Second, for one






15T h i sm e a n st h a ti ti sm o r ec o s t l yi n(S|C) than in (J1) to implement one and the same
probability of success. The enhanced payoﬀs that choosing (S|C) against (J1) ensures,
conﬂict with the higher costs associated to this choice. Enhanced payoﬀs and cost savings
go in opposite directions, and which of them outweighs the other depends on the level of a
given implemented probability.
The optimal implemented probabilities associated with (J1) and (S|C) are not the same:
in (J1) they are systematically higher than in (S|C) and they are both increasing functions
of ∆. In addition, an increase in ∆ lets the optimal probability in (J1) increase more than the
one in (S|C). The optimal proﬁts themselves are strictly increasing functions of ∆ and the
relative impact of an increase in ∆ makes the enhanced payoﬀs advantage being relatively less
important as compared to the cost savings, when choosing (S|C) against (J1). There exists
a threshold value for ∆ above which (J1) is systematically preferred to (S|C), ∆ > 2
√
2−2.
A similar reasoning could be replicated in the comparison between (S|C) and (J2)
with the additional relative advantage of joining whenever ε allows for bigger and bigger
synergies: ∀ε ∈ ]−1,1[, the cutoﬀ value of ∆ for (J2) is smaller than the one for (J1) :
2
−2ε−1
1−ε − 2 < 2
√
2 − 2.
As observed, the optimal implemented probability of success is lower in the stand-alone
than in the joint cases. This is because potential expected payoﬀs associated with succeeding
alone are maximized for intermediate probabilities of success. Increasing the probability of
success further puts more weight on the shared market component in the expected payoﬀs,
which is common to both (S|C) and (J·), as compared to the component associated with
succeeding alone, which is speciﬁct o(S|C).
4 The principal-agent case
In this section we consider the entrepreneurs’ decisions with regard to the organizational
choice and the optimal contracts under the assumption that agents eﬀorts are not observable.
C o n t r a c t sc a n n o tb em a d ec o n t i n g e n to nt h el e v e lo ft h e s ee ﬀorts, but only on the veriﬁable
success or failure of the project.
Within this context, we replicate the analysis made in the previous section in order to
derive the optimal contracts and the internal organization chosen by the entrepreneurs, as
functions of ∆ and ε in a similar way as we did for the observable eﬀorts case. We then
compute the expected welfare induced by the privately optimal internal organizations.
Results will allow us to discuss the impact of agency problems on the decisions of whether
to enter a joint project. In contrast to the observable eﬀorts case, social welfare does not
coincide anymore with the overall expected proﬁts in the economy. Therefore, a conﬂict can
16potentially arise between the privately chosen organizations and the socially preferred ones.
We will characterize this conﬂict as a function of ∆ and ε.
4.1 Stand-alone (S)
As before, we distinguish between the independent and common market projects when we
derive optimal contracts. Again, if entrepreneurs decide to invest in a stand-alone project,
its probability of success is pi(S)=ei.
Eﬀorts are not observable, so that entrepreneurs have to provide their agents with incen-
tives to let them exert an eﬀort. In this case, agent i gets a positive bonus, bi, in case of
success of the project he conducts and zero otherwise (as it has been discussed in the general
setup of the model). Given this type of contract, agent i’s maximization program is:
max
ei











the solution to which gives the incentive compatibility constraint (IC):
ei = bi. (IC)
Entrepreneurs will take this constraint into account when they decide about the contract to
oﬀer to their agents. Notice that, no matter whether the markets are independent or common,
the incentive compatibility constraint to be taken into account by the entrepreneurs stays
the same.
4.1.1 Independent Markets (I)
Each entrepreneur solves for the following problem:
max
bi















i ≥ 0 (IR)
As a solution, the bonus received by either agent is the same, and, given the (IC),









The superscript u denotes the proﬁt-maximizing solution in the unobservable eﬀorts case.
Note that the induced probability of success is half the one that an owner-manager would
have chosen.
















4.1.2 Common Market (C)
Each entrepreneur, solves the following maximization problem:
max
bi


















i ≥ 0. (IR)
















where, again, the superscript u denotes the proﬁt-maximizing solution in the unobservable
eﬀorts case. Note that the implemented probability of success is more than half the one
chosen under observable eﬀo r t s .T h i si sd u et oas t r a t e g i ce ﬀect between the owners.
















4.2 Joint-one agent (J1)
We know that, if entrepreneurs decide to invest in a joint-one agent project, its success
probability is p(J1) = e. Again, entrepreneurs face a (IC) constraint that comes from the
agent’s utility maximization problem corresponding to the one of the stand-alone case above.
18The incentive compatibility constraint is therefore the same where the index i has been
dropped:
e = b. (42)





[e∆ − eb] (43)





2 ≥ 0, (IR)















Here the induced probability of eﬀort is half the one that an owner-manager would have
chosen.
Given the equal sharing rule between entrepreneurs after joining forces, the implemented




















4.3 Joint-two agents (J2)
If entrepreneurs decide to invest in a joint-two agents project, the probability of success is








1−ε . Entrepreneurs face again the
(IC) constraint, one for each of their employed agents, and, again, share equally the bonuses
to be paid to them, as well as the potential value coming from the joint project.
Each agent maximizes his own utility w.r.t. his own eﬀort taking as given the one of the
other agent. The ﬁrst order conditions of these problems determine each agent’s reaction
function. When taken together, the reaction functions lead to the (IC) constraint to be
taken into account by the joint entity when solving for the optimal implemented contract to
be oﬀered to the agents.
19The agents’ maximization problems are:
max
e1


























































1−ε b − e2 =0 . (51)
The Nash solution to the agents’ problems gives the (IC) constraint:
e1 (J2) = e2 (J2) = e(J2) = 2
ε
1−εb. (IC)
The probability of success for the joint-two agents case, compatible with the (IC) con-









2 ≥ 0. (53)





[p(J2)(∆ − 2b)] (54)







2 ≥ 0 ∀i (IR)






and, as a consequence, the implemented eﬀorts and probability of success are:
e














20T h ep r o b a b i l i t yi n d u c e db yk e e p i n gt w oa g e n t si se q u a lt oo n ef o u r t ht h eo n ec h o s e n
by owners-managers. We should, thus, expect (J2) t ob ec h o s e nl e s so f t e nt h a ni nt h e
owner-manager’s case.




























4.4 Optimal organizational form for unobservable eﬀorts
We are now able to draw some conclusions about the privately chosen organizations under the
unobservable eﬀorts assumption, and about their impact on social welfare. Results obtained
in the previous sections are summarized in the following table:























































A comparison of the diﬀerent outcomes, leads to the following propositions:
Proposition 2 Under the principal-agents assumption, (alternatively: for unobservable ef-
forts),
(i) in the independent markets case, entrepreneurs always invest jointly,
(a) for ε ∈ ]0,1[ they keep both agents and
(b) for ε/ ∈ ]0,1[ they keep one agent;
(ii) in the common markets case,










and invest in a stand-alone project otherwise,






and invest in a stand-alone project otherwise.
Proposition 3 Under the principal-agents assumption, (alternatively: for unobservable ef-
forts),
(i) in the independent markets case,
(a) the private decision to invest jointly is welfare improving as compared to staying
alone;
(b) however, there exists a conﬂict between the privately chosen and the socially de-
sirable joint conﬁgurations: for ε ∈ ]−0.125,0[ (J1) is privately chosen whereas
(J2) would have been socially preferable;
(ii) in the common markets case,
(a) if the joint conﬁguration is chosen, this is always welfare improving as compared
to staying alone;
(b) however, two diﬀerent types of conﬂicts between the privately chosen and the so-
cially desirable conﬁgurations may arise:




, (J1) is privately chosen whereas
(J2) would have been socially preferable;

























, (S|C) is pri-
vately chosen whereas (J2) w o u l dh a v eb e e ns o c i a l l yp r e f e r a b l e .
Notice that now in our results we need to distinguish between privately and socially
preferred conﬁgurations, as they do not coincide anymore due to the unobservability of the
agents’ eﬀorts.
As before, when entrepreneurs are facing a independent markets world, there are only
eﬀects on the expected cost side. Even though the magnitude of these costs is changed, due
to the incentive compatible contracts to be oﬀered to the agents, their relative diﬀerence
makes still entrepreneurs prefer to join over staying alone. Therefore, all comments made
i nt h eo b s e r v a b l ee ﬀorts case apply here as well. In addition, we can observe that the
privately chosen joint conﬁgurations are welfare improving over staying alone. However,
ac o n ﬂict between privately chosen and socially desirable conﬁgurations arises here. The
22joint conﬁguration where two agents are kept is chosen too seldomly as compared to what
would have been socially desirable. To few joint projects exploiting potential synergies are
observed.
In a similar way, when entrepreneurs face a common market, the two eﬀects identiﬁed in
t h eo b s e r v a b l ee ﬀorts case appear again. In the interval ε ∈ ]0,1[, i.e. when agents’ eﬀorts
are complements, the option (J2) is always preferred to (J1), no matter which is the value of
the market. In this case, entrepreneurs join as before, opting for (J2) over (S|C), but only
for a restricted range of the parameters ∆ and ε : the higher the degree of complementarity
between agents’ eﬀorts, the lower the level of the value of the market necessary to sustain the
choice of (J2); above a given threshold for this agents’ complementarity, no matter which is
the value of the market, the option (J2) is always sustained. When ε/ ∈ ]0,1[ if the value of




, (J1) is preferred to (S|C). A similar choice
was taken under the observable eﬀorts assumption, but for a smaller range of ε and a lower





Concerning the impact of privately taken decision, we can observe that here as well, as for
the independent markets case, if a joint conﬁguration is privately chosen this is also welfare
improving over staying alone. However, too few joint projects with two agents are chosen as
compared to what would be socially desirable. For high values of the market entrepreneurs
choose joint project where only one agent is kept, and for low values of the market they
choose instead a stand-alone project.


































Figure 3: Privately chosen conﬁgurations for unobservable eﬀorts.
Note that, as for the observable eﬀorts case, we derived the optimal contracts not taking
into account any restrictions on the parameters ∆ and ε such that the associated probabil-
23ities of success are well deﬁned, e.g. smaller than 1. As before, it can be shown that the
unrestricted and restricted contracts can be both summarized in the same ﬁgure, as done in
ﬁg u r e3 ,w h e r er e s u l t sf o rt h ec o m m o nm a r k e tc a s ec a nb es h o w ng r a p h i c a l l y .
In this ﬁgure, Πu
(S),(J2), Πu
(S),(J1) and Πu
(J1),(J2) represent the relevant indiﬀerence curves
as the ones under the observable eﬀorts case. The superscript u refers to the unobservable
case we are describing now. As before, these three curves depict three regions: one, where
ﬁrms prefer (S|C), one, in which ﬁrms prefer (J1), and, one, where the (J2) conﬁguration
is chosen.
In addition, as we want to describe the possible conﬂicts between the privately and
the socially preferred conﬁgurations, we draw ﬁgure 4, where the indiﬀerence curves for




regions where respectively staying alone is preferred to joining with two agents, or with one,
or joining with one is preferred to joining with two agents.












































Figure 4: Privately and socially preferred conﬁgurations for unobservable eﬀorts.
In ﬁgure 4, for the comparisons of interest, we have highlighted the two areas of conﬂict
described above. In area A entrepreneurs choose to join with one agent, while joining with
two would have been socially preferred. This happens for high enough values of the market,




, and low levels of agents’ eﬀorts duplication, i.e. ε ∈ ]−0.125,0[. This
conﬂict is of the same nature as the one observed under the independent market assumption.
It derives from the fact that joining with two agents is more costly privately than socially
as entrepreneurs face a higher costs that comes from the informational rent to be paid
t oa g e n t s . T h i se x p l a i n sw h yj o i n tp r o j e c t sw h e r et w oa g e n t sa r ek e p ta r eo b s e r v e dm o r e
24seldomly than socially desired. In area B entrepreneurs pursue a stand-alone project, while,
again, a joint project where both agents were kept would have been socially preferred instead.
This happens for values of the markets smaller than for area A,c o m b i n e dw i t he ﬀorts that
are slight duplicates up to slight complements. Starting from the value of the market that
makes both the society and the entrepreneurs indiﬀerent between staying alone and joining
with one agent, the lower the values of the market, the higher the eﬀorts’ complementarities
have to be in order to observe a conﬂict of this nature.




















































Figure 5: Comparison between privately and socially preferred conﬁgurations for observable
and unobservable eﬀorts.
Figure 5 compares results obtained in this section with the ones obtained under the
observable eﬀorts case. The solid lines depict the private (and social, as they coincide)
indiﬀerence curves for the observable eﬀorts case, whereas the dashed lines depict those for
the unobservable one. The graph shows that there are two implications of moral hazard
in our model. On the one hand, the value of the market necessary to make the option of
joining with one agent preferred over staying alone shift upwards: it is higher under the
moral hazard assumption than without moral hazard. Staying alone is now preferred to
joining with either one or two agents more often. On the other hand, joining with two
agents is chosen only for higher complementarities, even when the value of the market may
be relatively low, or for low complementarities provided that the value of the market is high
enough. The reason for this shift is that a low level of the market should be compensated by
higher complementarities than under the observable eﬀorts assumption for letting the option
(J2) be preferred over staying alone. The net eﬀe c to v e rt h ej o i n to n e - a g e n tc o n ﬁguration is
therefore ambiguous. This is because it is true that only a higher value of the market makes
25entrepreneurs eager to join with one agent now, but at the same time, thanks to the shift
on the right of the indiﬀerence curve against the joint option with two agents, this becomes
possible in combination with a larger range of agents’ eﬀorts substitutability than before.
Introducing moral hazard changes the cost side of the model: It makes the implementation
of o n ea n dt h es a m eprobability of success in both, (S|C) and (J1) twice as expensive: the
cost of implementing p in (S|C) is now bp = p2 and the cost of implementing p in (J1) is
1
2bp = 1
2p2.T h ed i ﬀerence in these costs is also twice as big. This eﬀe c tw o u l dp e rs es p e a k
in favor of observing more often a sharing of the costs under (J1). However, under moral
hazard the optimal implemented probability of success are, as under the observable eﬀorts
case, not the same. In (J1) the optimal implemented probability of success is one half of
that in the situation with observable eﬀorts, while the one in (S|C) is more than one half
the one under observable eﬀorts, even though reduced. This diﬀerence in the change of the
implemented probabilities, makes the relative cost savings associated to (J1) as compared
to the enhanced expected payoﬀs of staying alone, not as high as before. The option (S|C)
is now preferred more often over (J1). In addition, even though the cost savings advantage
is partially lost, the option (J1) is now preferred more easily against the option (J2) -
because of the exacerbated cost induced by the moral hazard behavior which makes it more
costly to join with two agents, joining with two agents is chosen only for higher levels of
complementarity than before. Therefore, the overall net eﬀect of moral hazard on (J1),a s
it has been pointed out, is ambiguous.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have introduced agency problems into the RJV formation literature, de-
parting from the traditional owner-managers view. This way, we have given an alternative
rationale for joint research projects through optimal implemented contracts. The model pro-
posed has explained the diﬀerence in the internal organizations of joint projects between the
situations in which there are owner-managers as compared to when there is a principal-agent
relation between the owner(s) and the agents carrying out the research.
Our results have shown that in the owner-manager case, research is always conducted
jointly for projects targeting independent markets (or market segments), but only for suf-
ﬁciently high values of the market or high enough synergies between agents for projects
targeting a common market (or common market segments). When owners face agency prob-
lems instead, the decision of going jointly is taken only for higher values of the market and/or
higher synergies. We have shown that owners choose less often to let both their units work
together if they face moral hazard than otherwise. It has also been shown that for agents’ ef-
26forts that range from slight duplicates to slight complements there exist a conﬂict: privately
entrepreneurs either decide to stay alone or to join with only one agent, but socially a joint
project with both agents would have been preferred. Entrepreneurs choose too seldomly
to make use of possible synergies between agents as compared to what would be socially
desirable.
Our results suggest that support should be oﬀered to joint projects, provided that they
combine research units and, thereby, exploit synergies.
Results have been obtained taking an exogenously ﬁxed overall value of the market, either
independent or common. We have argued that making this assumption was not allowing us
to look at any market power eﬀects within our analysis. A clariﬁcation on the role of this
assumption is now possible. When considering the common markets assumption we have let
the projects become rivals. This way, an intermediate case between the no competition at all
(the one of the independent markets) and the full competition one, which would correspond
to a subsequent stage where ﬁrms might have had to compete on the market for selling a
produced good had they not chosen to join, has been allowed for. In Fabrizi-Lippert (2004),
pure market power considerations are instead considered in model where a project has to
be adopted that would lead to an production cost reducing innovation. In that context,
ﬁrms that originally compete on the market have to decide whether to join and the role of
a competition authority is explicitly taken into account to characterize the types of errors
that may be made when having to accept or refuse a proposed merger.
In our model the eﬀorts that agents provide have not been bounded ex-ante. This is
because the optimal contracts always implement eﬀort levels such that the probabilities of
success are well deﬁned. However, the model could be used as well in order to assess the
impact of part time versus full time job on the privately oﬀered wage contracts, and on the
social welfare. This would be possible by reinterpreting our level of eﬀort as the number of
hours worked. Our joint-two agents case would then represent an equivalent to part-time
jobs, while the joint-one agent case would play the role of a full time job. This could give
an explanation, other than demand side arguments such as fears of job instability or the
rigidities introduced by legal constraints into the labor market, on why part-time jobs are
rarely observed as compared to full-time jobs. Even when these fears or rigidities were not
present, this result might be observed as a consequence of an optimal internal organization
decision.
One possible extension of this paper would be to analyze patent litigation issues. This
would allow for an additional rationale for the occurrence of joint projects. Firms may
desire to join to insure themselves against the risk of facing a litigation, and this eﬀect may
contrast with the one we have characterized in our model: the tendency under moral hazard
27to observe too few joint projects where both agents were kept.
Another interesting extension could be to allow the number of entrepreneurs and agents
t ov a r y . E x a m p l e so fs u c hc a s e sa r ep a r t n e r s h i p ss u c ha sl a wﬁrms, where a number of
seniors and juniors cooperate within the same organization in a proportion which may be
variable. Our model could help understand which would be the optimal organization of such
a partnership in terms of the relative number of senior partners versus junior associates.
A Proof of t1 = t2 for (J2)
In this appendix, we show that paying equal transfers in the (J2) case is cost minimizing.
To show this, we minimize the transfer implementing a certain probability level, ﬁrst under
the assumptions that eﬀorts are observable and then unobservable.
A.1 Observable eﬀorts
Entrepreneurs employ two agents to whom a contract, that speciﬁes an eﬀort level and
transfer(s), is proposed. Each agent then has the choice to accept or reject this contract.
Thus, entrepreneurs minimize their transfers paid subject only to their respective (IR) con-
straints. In this case, the cost of implementing a certain probability level is exactly equal to
the disutility of the eﬀorts exerted to achieve this probability level.































The ﬁrst order conditions to this minimization problem,
∂Co(J2)
∂e1





























e1 = e2 = e.
This implies that symmetric transfers are optimal.
28A.2 Unobservable eﬀorts
Replicating the same analysis for the world with moral hazard, requires to consider that
now entrepreneurs have to oﬀer contracts specifying the transfer to be paid to their agent(s)
depending on each state of nature: a positive bonus in case of success and zero in case of
failure, thus, satisfying the (LL) constraints. Since eﬀorts are not observable here, entre-
preneurs have to give incentives, take (IC) constraints into account, through transfers, in
addition to the (IR) constraints.
The joint entity solves now the following minimization problem:
min
b1,b2


























ei ≥ 0 (IRi)


















































































































































































































Solving for this problem, leads again to the following result:
29e1 = e2 = e ⇒ b1 = b2 = b.
An intuition for this result is that, even though the technology is not convex for ε<0,t h e
non-linear iso-cost lines give rise to an interior solution for ε not too negative.
BP r o p o s i t i o n 1





































































































30CP r o p o s i t i o n 2






































































































DP r o p o s i t i o n 3
Proof.







































































which is the same problem as in proposition 2 (i).


















































































































ln2 > ln3 − ln7
32Assume 1 − ε>0
3εln2 − ln2 > (ln3 − ln7)(1 − ε)
3εln2 − ln2 > (ln3 − ln7) − (ln3 − ln7)ε
ε(3ln2 + (ln3 − ln7)) > ln3 − ln7 + ln2
ε>
ln3 − ln7 + ln2
3ln2+ln3− ln7
≈− 0.12511
Assume 1 − ε<0
3εln2 − ln2 < (ln3 − ln7)(1 − ε)
3εln2 − ln2 < (ln3 − ln7) − (ln3 − ln7)ε
ε(3ln2 + (ln3 − ln7)) < ln3 − ln7 + ln2
ε<
ln3 − ln7 + ln2
3ln2+ln3− ln7
≈− 0.12511
which is a contradiction to 1 − ε<0.
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